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THE SCOPE, CONTENT, AND INTENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN BROADCASTS

4 September 1943

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W. Malenbaum, JFI

By S. G. Banks

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THE SCOPE, CONTENT, AND INTENT  
OF SOVIET FOREIGN BROADCASTS

*Declassified  
file no. 247*

I. Soviet Facilities for Foreign Broadcasting

According to estimates reported in June 1943 by the Program Information Unit of the Federal Communications Commission, the Soviet Union has at its disposal for regular short wave broadcasting at least twenty-eight transmitters. The term "regular short wave broadcasts" refers only to transmissions designed for public information and entertainment; it does not include transmissions employed for specific purposes such as military communications, meteorological data, etc. Twenty of these transmitters are located in European Russia and are distributed as follows: eleven in Moscow, four in Kuibyshev, three in Leningrad, and one each in Tiflis and Yerevan. Of the eight transmitters in Asiatic Russia, three are located at Khabarovsk, two in Komsomolsk, and one each in Magadan, Nikolayevsk, and Petropavlovsk. <sup>1/</sup> Since Moscow's one hundred kilowatt short wave station was destroyed by German bombing early in the war, the transmitters in the Asiatic portion of the

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<sup>1/</sup> Shortwave Broadcast Transmitters of the World, Program Information Unit, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission, 12 June 1943; pages 2 and 5. (Confidential)



USSR, which are estimated by FCC engineers to have a strength of fifty kilowatts, are now the most powerful in the Soviet Union. The short wave transmitters in European Russia are believed to range in power from five to twenty kilowatts. 1/

In number of regular short wave transmitters, the Soviet Union compares very favorably with Great Britain (twenty-five transmitters) and with the United States (twenty-one transmitters). Moreover, the USSR has the strategic advantage of being able to broadcast very effectively, from the point of view of reception, both to Europe and to Asia. On the other hand, there are in continental Europe alone forty-eight short wave transmitters directly controlled by the Axis (including one station in Kiev in occupied Russia), as well as four transmitters in Finland, four in Portugal, and eight in Spain -- all of which are strongly anti-Soviet in orientation. In addition, Soviet radio stations do not match those of Germany and Italy -- nor those of Great Britain and the United States -- in power, for each of these nations have several short wave transmitters of one hundred kilowatt strength. 2/

Furthermore, the Soviet Union does not use all of its twenty-eight short wave transmitters for broadcasting abroad. The wide expanse of Soviet territory requires the extensive use of short wave in domestic transmission. Thus, as far as FCC engineers have been able to determine, all programs (exclusive of possible Morse transmissions) broad-

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1/ Op. cit.

2/ Op. cit., pages 1, 2, and 6





cast from Yerevan, Nagadan, Nikolayevsk, Khabarovsk, and Petropavlovsk ✓  
are directed at Soviet audiences; similarly, the bulk of programs  
emanating from Leningrad, a large proportion of those coming from  
Moscow, and number of those originating at Komsomolsk are intended  
for home consumption. 1/

By far the greatest number of Soviet foreign broadcasts (about  
80 percent) originate in Moscow. This is true even for transmissions  
directed to the Far East and, across the Pacific, to western North  
America; such programs are relayed from Moscow by wire, or possibly  
by short wave, to the more powerful transmitters at Komsomolsk in the  
Soviet Far East, and are then re-transmitted to their ultimate  
destination. A given program is frequently broadcast over several  
wave bands simultaneously in order to facilitate reception in various  
localities under various conditions. This is particularly common in  
instances when the territory concerned is rather extensive. For  
example, many broadcasts to North America are transmitted simultaneously  
over as many as five transmitters -- three in Moscow and two in  
Komsomolsk.

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1/ This and all subsequent information herein reported is derived  
(until otherwise noted) from data published in the Program  
Schedule of Foreign Broadcasters, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence  
Service, Federal Communications Commission, 28 May 1943  
(Confidential), pages 98-118.



While Radio Moscow, either directly or by relay, broadcasts to all corners of the world, the radio stations located in other cities are generally rather specialized as far as direction of transmission is concerned. As has been noted, transmitters in Komsomolsk are utilized for relaying Moscow programs to the Far East and western North America. The Tiflis station, from which about 12 percent of all foreign programs originate, beams its transmissions toward Southern Europe and the Balkans. Kuibyshev, from which about 8 percent of all foreign programs emanate, broadcasts mainly to central Europe. And Leningrad, which is the source of less than 1 percent of all foreign transmissions, directs its broadcasts chiefly to northern Europe.

## II. Geographical Direction and Linguistic Scope of Soviet Foreign Transmissions.

The general scope of the foreign short wave broadcasts of the USSR is shown in Table I. The table gives the number of transmissions and the total time devoted daily in each language to the several geographic areas. Total and sub-total entries in the table show that Soviet radio stations beam almost seventy program hours a day, in over twenty-five different languages, to territories outside the USSR. Of these, over fifty program hours a day, or 77 percent of all foreign broadcasts, are directed to Europe, about five hours a day (slightly over 7 percent) are beamed to North America, approximately four and one-half hours (almost 7 percent) to the Far East, three hours (4 percent) to Latin America, and roughly another three hours (4 percent) to the Far East.





TABLE I. FOREIGN SHORT WAVE BROADCASTS OF THE USSR \*

<u>Direction of Transmission</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Number of Transmissions Daily</u>	<u>Total Transmission Daily</u>
Europe	German	28	10 hrs. 25 mins.
	German for Austria	3	55 "
	French	14	4 hrs. 30 "
	Czech	14	4 " 10 "
	Hungarian	12	3 " 40 "
	Italian	9	3 " 30 "
	Polish	12	3 " 30 "
	Bulgarian	10	2 " 50 "
	Finnish	9	2 " 40 "
	English	7	2 " 30 "
	Greek	7	2 " 5 "
	Spanish	6	2 " 0 "
	Norwegian	5	1 " 35 "
	Rumanian	5	1 " 35 "
	Slovene	6	1 " 35 "
	Serb	3	1 " 5 "
	Swedish	4	1 " 5 "
	Dutch	4	1 " 0 "
	Slovak	4	1 " 0 "
	Croat	3	55 "
	Portuguese	1	15 "
	Yiddish	twice weekly	15 "
		<u>Sub total</u>	<u>52 hrs. 52 mins.</u>
North America	English	8	3 hrs. 20 mins.
	Italian	1	30 "
	Czech	1	15 "
	Polish	1	15 "
	Ukrainian	1	15 "
	Croat	three times weekly	30 "
	Serb	twice weekly	30 "
	Slovene	twice weekly	30 "
		<u>Sub Total</u>	<u>5 hrs. 5 mins.</u>
Latin America	Spanish	3	2 hrs. 0 mins.
	Italian	1	30 "
	German	1	15 "
	Portuguese	1	15 "
		<u>Sub total</u>	<u>3 hrs. 0 mins.</u>
Near and Middle East	Turkish	3	2 hrs. 15 mins.
	Persian	4	1 " 40 "
	Urdu (for India)	2	40 "
		<u>Sub total</u>	<u>4 hrs. 35 mins.</u>
Far East	Japanese	4	1 hrs. 40 mins.
	Chinese	3	1 " 25 "
		<u>Sub total</u>	<u>3 hrs. 5 mins.</u>
		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>68 hrs. 37 mins.</u>

\* At bottom of next page.



It will be observed further that of the twenty-one languages heard in Soviet transmissions to Europe, German is by far the most common. The German language transmissions occupy in all almost twelve hours of radio time daily and constitute over 20 percent of all programs beamed to Europe and 17 percent of all broadcasts beamed abroad by the USSR. Thus, with the exception of Russian itself, German is the most frequently heard language on Soviet short wave transmitters.

It is of interest to note in passing that Axis transmitters retaliate in kind almost to the same degree. They transmit to the Soviet Union about ten program hours each day, four of which are in Russian, approximately three in Ukrainian, and the rest in the languages of several of the other Soviet nationalities such as Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaidzhan, Baghestan, and Tatar. 1/

Next to Russian and German, English is the most frequently heard language in Russian short-wave transmissions. Approximately six program hours are transmitted in this language each day, which is approximately half the time devoted to broadcasts in German. The majority (about three-fifths) of the English transmissions are beamed to North America, and the remaining two-fifths to Europe, which, of course, means primarily to the British Isles.

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1/ Cp. cit., Pages 37-8

\* The data in this table were computed from material in the following sources: Program Schedule of Foreign Broadcasts, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission, 22 May 1943 (Confidential), pages 98-118; Despatch No. 146, American Embassy at Kuibyshev, 15 November 1942 (Free).





An interesting feature of Soviet transmissions to North America is the fact that, in addition to broadcasts in English, they include regular transmissions in Italian, Polish, Czech, and Ukrainian as well as Slovene, Croat, and Serb.

Other pertinent facts revealed by the data presented in Table I will be considered as they occur in connection with discussion of the content and intent of Soviet foreign broadcasts, which is presented in the concluding sections of the report.

### III. Available Sources for the Content of Soviet Broadcasts.

At the present time, monitored texts and summaries of Soviet broadcasts are made available chiefly by two organizations -- the British Broadcasting Corporation, and the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the United States Federal Communications Commission. Since it would be impracticable to monitor, let alone translate and publish, the full text of all broadcasts beamed by Soviet transmitters, both BBC and FCC prepare what may be considered to be representative samples of the broadcasts transmitted at a given hour to a given locality. Thus, for example, BBC supplies numerous sample texts of the Soviet foreign broadcasts beamed by Moscow transmitters in English to North America and in various languages to Europe. 1/ The only Soviet foreign broadcasts monitored extensively by FCC are the English transmissions which, relayed from Moscow, are beamed to North America

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1/ Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, Part II (Section 4B), issued daily by the British Broadcasting Corporation, Monitoring Service.



from transmitters in the Soviet Far East. 1/ These are not available in full in published form, but representative excerpts, along with occasional samples of broadcasts transmitted directly from Moscow, Leningrad, and Tiflis, are cited, summarized, and discussed in several FCC releases. 2/

#### IV. Description of the Sample Utilized for Study.

In view of the wider coverage of Soviet foreign broadcasts provided by BBC listening posts, and in view of the fact that the pertinent material published by FCC appears in scattered sources and in a form inconvenient for the type of analysis to be undertaken, the study of style and content of Soviet broadcasts described in succeeding sections was based almost entirely on the monitored texts appearing in the BBC Daily Digest of World Broadcasts. To check on the degree to which the material in the BBC sample was representative of the broadcasts of the period the BBC texts were compared with the translators' copies of the broadcasts monitored by FCC. In many

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1/ Supra, page 3.

2/ FCC Teletype Service, A Wire. This teletype service provides full texts and excerpts of the broadcasts which FCC editors regard to be most important.

Daily Report of Foreign Broadcasts. In this publication foreign broadcasts are quoted and summarized more extensively than in the teletype.

Weekly Review of Foreign Broadcasts. The Review contains interpretations and points out propaganda trends. A section on the USSR is included.

Radio Moscow Review. This publication, appearing biweekly, is devoted specifically to an analysis of the content and intent of broadcasts originating from Moscow.





cases there was exact duplication of the material covered with only slight and inconsequential discrepancies in translation. Where different broadcast materials were covered these did not differ in terms of general style, content, and emphasis. Consequently, it appeared quite justifiable to regard the texts monitored by BBC as typical for the period considered and entirely adequate for purposes of analysis. To provide a large and representative sample, all texts of Soviet foreign broadcasts published in full in the BBC Digest for the six week period between 23 May and 6 July 1943 inclusive were examined in detail. The sample included representative Soviet transmissions in English to North America and in the following languages to Europe: German (including German transmissions for Austria, frequently in the Austrian vernacular), French, Czech, Hungarian, Italian, Polish, Finnish, English, Spanish, and Rumanian. It will be observed that, with the exception of Bulgarian and Greek, these include all the languages used in Soviet broadcasts abroad of two or more hours duration each day. (See Table I). The occasional examples of Soviet transmissions in Bulgarian, Greek, Serb, and Turkish monitored by FCC during the same period were examined as well, but were found to be too fragmentary to warrant consideration. Also surveyed, but omitted in the basic analysis were all items which had been merely summarized rather than monitored in full. The summaries were excluded for two reasons: first, they were frequently so short as to leave in doubt the content and intent of the original item; second, since they gave little indication of the length of the original item, their use might distort the relative emphasis actually given to various subjects. Summarized



items were nevertheless examined in order to determine whether their omission would result in a seriously biased sample. The examination revealed no basis for concluding that the summarized materials differed significantly in general content from those which had been reported in full.

#### V. Method of analysis.

As was indicated in an earlier exploratory report, items broadcast by Soviet transmitters fall into fairly well-defined categories of subject matter. <sup>1/</sup> To determine the relative topical emphasis in Soviet foreign transmissions, all items published in the BBC Digest for the period specified above were classified according to the category in which they appeared to fit most appropriately. The specific categories utilized will be described in succeeding sections of this report. While there were a few items which were so general in content as to preclude inclusion under any single category, and also a few each of which, for one reason or another, appeared to be sui generis, the great majority (about 97 percent) were readily classifiable under general topical headings.

After all items had been classified as above, the frequency of entries in each category was noted. In addition, since a measure based solely on the number of items would not take into account the length of the item, an index of this variable was obtained by counting the number of lines in each article. Since all articles were typed in the same format, such an index provided an adequately reliable

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1/ The Character of Broadcasts by the USSR to Other Nations for the Period Between February 24 and March 2, 1943, Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, 6 April 1943 (Confidential)



measure.

More than five hundred items (515) representing well over six thousand lines (6,587) were included in the analysis. Slightly more than one-third of the items had been broadcast to North America and Europe in English, slightly less than a third represented transmissions to the occupied or German dominated territories of Europe in the various languages listed in the preceding section. Since, as will be pointed out, treatment given by Soviet broadcasters to such countries as Italy, Finland, and Spain is -- except for certain specific emphases to be indicated below -- essentially the same as that given to the countries formally occupied by Germany, in subsequent discussion both groups will be included under a single term "Axis-dominated and Axis-occupied territory" (or "countries").

#### VI. The General Style of Soviet Broadcasts

As was indicated in an exploratory report, 1/ Soviet broadcasts may generally be described as direct, factual, expository, and occasionally analytical and disputatious. The majority of the items are rather brief and are in the form and language of the news communique. Lengthier items consist in materials such as speeches, articles from Pravda, Izvestiya, and other Soviet publications, or commentaries roughly of the type broadcast by American news analysts. In the main, throughout all Soviet broadcasts there is an apparent effort toward creating an impression of objectivity and credibility.

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1/ Op. cit., page 1.





For example, for items dealing with conditions in Axis territory, neutral or Axis sources -- chiefly German or Swedish newspapers -- are frequently cited. Also quoted as supporting evidence are excerpts from Axis broadcasts, letters from home found on captured soldiers, the statements of the captured soldiers themselves, and the testimony obtained from inhabitants in territory reoccupied by the Russians.

On the whole, there is relatively little resort in Soviet foreign broadcasts to the more common propaganda devices. Soviet broadcasters apparently adhere to certain standards of what may be called professional dignity. For example, they do not stoop to the "folksy", "here is the lowdown" type of approach favored by the Axis radio. Name-calling, when it does occur, is almost matter-of-fact. [It may be said that in Soviet usage "Nazi-robber", like "damn-Yankee" in our own South, is treated as one word]. Indeed, the term "matter-of-fact" applies in general to precisely those characteristics of Soviet broadcasts which are apt to strike the American observer as most clearly propagandistic. These are, on the one hand, the constant expressions of bitter invective and uncompromising hatred toward the enemy, and, on the other hand, the tone adopted in dealing with the Soviet armies and the home front -- a tone openly exhortative and eulogistic to the point of seeming naive. These characteristics, which are found also in Soviet publications and public utterances, may sound artificial and overdone to American ears, but there is reason to believe that they are quite genuine and not so much propagandistic as habitual. The use of stereotyped expressions, slogans, and exhortations has been characteristic of the Soviet way of life since its inception.



The consistently serious, matter-of-fact tone of Soviet broadcasts is further evidenced by the fact that, with the exception of an occasional interview, Soviet broadcasters do not resort to more dramatic forms of presentation such as plays, discussions, or on-the-scene reports. Similarly, comedy and -- as far as available evidence indicates -- music are entirely absent in the foreign transmissions. This does not mean that humor is lacking; on the contrary, sarcasm and ridicule are among the Russians' favorite weapons of debate. Fundamentally, however, as is quite to be expected, Soviet broadcasts are not intended to entertain; their style reflects the serious, realistic nature of what appears to be their pre-eminent concern -- the attempt to influence the direction and strength of the manifold forces bearing upon the successful prosecution of the war. What, in Soviet opinion, the nature of these forces and their relative importance might be, as revealed in Soviet foreign broadcasts, is discussed in the concluding sections of the report.

#### VII. A Regional Classification of the Content of Soviet Foreign Broadcasts

An analysis of the content of all the monitored texts of Soviet foreign broadcasts published by EBC for a six-week period revealed that 30 percent of all items, or 77 percent of total linage, dealt with Axis Europe; i.e., Germany, Italy, the occupied territories, and the countries where Axis influence is still dominant -- Finland and Spain. [The above percentages do not include reports of strictly military developments on the fighting fronts]. It is of interest to note



further that, as may be deduced from the data in Table I, more than fifty program hours a day or over 70 percent of all foreign broadcasts are directed to continental Europe (i.e. Europe exclusive of the British Isles); and that with the exception of a one-hour daily broadcast to Sweden, all of these transmissions are directed to Axis countries or to Finland, Spain, and Portugal -- nations which have been strongly anti-Soviet in attitude. In short, the chief targets of Soviet foreign transmissions, both from the point of view of direction and content are the territories under Axis influence.

Bulletins from the fighting fronts accounted for about 10 percent of all broadcasts examined. About three-quarters of these military reports dealt with events on the Russo-German front, and the remainder were concerned with Allied activities in the European theater.

While items dealing with the United Nations (exclusive of strictly military bulletins) comprised slightly more than 5 percent of the total number of items surveyed, the unusual length of articles paying tribute to Anglo-American-Soviet solidarity brought the proportion of total lineage devoted to United Nations topics to almost 8 percent.

Events within the USSR itself furnished materials for from 1 to 2 percent of all broadcasts in the sample, and developments in neutral countries contributed another 1 to 2 percent. From 2 to 3 percent of all items and lineage treated with topics not rigidly classifiable under a purely geographic or military heading.





#### VIII. A Topical Classification of the Content of Soviet Foreign Broadcasts

A more revealing picture of the content of Soviet foreign broadcasts was obtained by classification of items into topical categories, including some of those mentioned above but in general more specific and more numerous. After such a classification had been made, it was found that two categories out of the total of twenty contained almost half of all the items and linage. These two categories, which together included about 45 percent of all the broadcasts in the six-week sample and approximately 60 percent of the broadcasts dealing with Axis territory, were concerned with items describing the extent of weakness and unrest in the Axis camp. The category Axis Weakness, which was the larger of the two from the point of view of linage, deserves some attention.

Axis Weakness. Over 24 percent of the items in the sample, which -- because of the length and detail of many expository articles -- represented almost 30 percent of the total linage, logically fell under the heading of Axis Weakness. Items in this category included those dealing with the following subjects (given roughly in the order of the relative frequency with which they appeared).

- a). Military weakness. Items dealing with the shortage of military manpower and the air inferiority of the Axis were particularly frequent.
- b). Difficulties in production. These were frequently related to the labor shortage and to the effects of Allied bombings.
- c). Declining morale and mounting fears of invasion. Letters from home found on captured German soldiers were often cited in evidence. The demoralizing effect of Allied air raids was mentioned in this connection, as well as reports of evacuation from western and southern coastal areas and from cities in eastern Europe.



- d). Dilemma of Axis propagandists. The problems created for Axis propagandists by recent military reverses, manpower shortages, production losses, and the like were described, and many examples cited of contradictions and unfulfilled prophecies.
- e). Presence of epidemics, hunger, housing shortages and generally-lowered standards of living.

In addition to Germany, the country most frequently referred to in reports of Axis weakness was Italy. France, Norway, Hungary, and Rumania also received specific mention.

Materials dealing with Axis weakness were particularly prominent in transmissions to Germany proper, wherein they made up well over one-third of the items and lineage examined. A common practice of Soviet broadcasters in these transmissions was to point out the similarity of the present situation to that of 1913 and to point to respects in which conditions now were even more serious. Materials dealing with Axis weakness were least prominent in transmissions to the Axis-occupied and Axis-dominated countries, in which they constituted no more than 15 percent of items and lineage. Of the broadcasts in English to Great Britain and North America, about 30 percent dealt with Axis weakness. A distinguishing feature of the English transmissions was the presence of several articles refuting and ridiculing German claims as to the impregnability of the "Atlantic Wall."

Axis Unrest. The category Axis Unrest is second in size to the category Axis Weakness only from the point of view of total lineage involved. In terms of number of items, the categories are approximately equal -- each containing about 24 percent of all the items in the sample. However, because of the brief, news-bulletin character of most of the items in the Axis Unrest classification, the lineage in this category



represents but 16 percent of the total. The subjects classified under this heading included all those describing disaffection, resistance, and revolt in the Axis camp. The most important among these subjects were the following:

- a). Guerrilla activity. This classification included all references to groups to whom the term "guerrilla" was applied by the Russians themselves.
- b). Sabotage. Instances of sabotage both in industry and agriculture were cited.
- c). Disaffection in Axis armed forces. Reports of desertions were particularly frequent in this classification which also included instances of mutiny, malingering, and disloyalty.
- d). Resistance and lack of cooperation among civilians. Strikes, resistance against labor mobilization, and refusal to cooperate in civilian defense activities constituted the content of items in this classification.
- e). Appeals for resistance and revolt. These appeals, usually addressed to the army or to the civilian population as a whole, were generally represented as having come spontaneously from German and Austrian soldiers captured by the Russians. The names of many of these soldiers, as well as their home addresses, were frequently cited. The appeals generally called for a revolt against Hitler and Nazism. Occasionally groups such as German women, Czech war workers, or the Rhinelanders would be addressed specifically.
- f). Anti-Axis demonstrations and protests. These included public expressions of discontent and disagreement with Axis policies, and demonstrations of patriotism -- e.g. display of the tricolor.

Other subjects under the category Axis Unrest included accounts of unfriendliness and hatred toward the German rulers, armed revolts (excluding those described specifically as guerrilla activities), assassinations, and government purges. The latter subjects did not occur as frequently as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.





Among transmissions dealing with Axis unrest, by far the most prominent topic both in terms of items and lineage was guerrilla activity. About one-third of all broadcasts in the Unrest category dealt with this subject.

Except when guerrilla activity was discussed, the countries most frequently referred to in items concerned with Axis unrest were, in order, France, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Norway. Also mentioned several times were Rumania, Germany, Italy, Holland, Austria, Spain, Yugoslavia, Finland, Bulgaria, Belgium, and Denmark. The presence of Spain in the above list illustrates the practice, common in Soviet broadcasts, of treating Spain simply as another country under German hegemony. The items dealing with Spain under the category of Axis unrest dealt with such matters as revolt and sabotage in Spanish industrial centers and ports providing supplies for the Axis war machine.

Of the items dealing with guerrillas, almost half were concerned with the activities of the Yugoslav partisans. It is of interest to note that in none of the items dealing with the Yugoslav guerrillas was there any reference to Mihailovich or his followers. Another 20 percent dealt with guerrilla warfare in Poland, 15 percent described partisan activities in territories within the 1940 borders of the USSR, and the remaining 20 percent treated with the exploits of guerrillas in Greece, France, Crete, Albania, and in Europe in general.

On the whole, items describing unrest were particularly prominent in transmissions to the occupied and Axis-dominated countries, somewhat less prominent in broadcasts to Germany proper, and least prominent in the transmissions to England and North America. There



was perhaps only one exception to this general trend: The proportion of items describing guerrilla activities was slightly higher among English transmissions than among transmissions either to Germany or to the occupied countries.

Military Developments on the Fighting Fronts. This category, which ranks third both in terms of number of items and liage, has already been discussed to some extent. The material classified under this heading was almost all in the form of bulletins, communiques, or military analyses dealing with current military operations. Even though no major land operations were under way on the Russo-German front during the period studied, about three-quarters of the items dealt with developments on that front, and were necessarily confined chiefly to reports of Soviet air raids on enemy territory and of the successful repulse of German air attacks. Similarly, the items concerned with Allied military activities -- one-quarter of the total in this category -- treated mainly Anglo-American bombings of the Ruhr and of other German and Italian industrial and military objectives. The aerial victory of Pantelleria was also mentioned.

The proportion of items in this category was noticeably greater among transmissions to Britain and North America than among those to Germany and to the occupied countries. About 20 percent of the material broadcast in English dealt with the topic in contrast to about 4 percent among broadcasts to Germany and less than 2 percent among transmissions to the occupied countries.

Next in importance among the several categories are three, Exposé of Axis Leaders, Dissension Among Axis Partners and Satellites, and Axis Exploitation. Each of these accounted for between 5 and 6 percent of



all broadcasts in the sample.

Exposé of Axis Leaders. Items in this category dealt with attacks against the Fascist elite -- particularly the leaders of Nazi Germany. The items were usually expository in character and stressed the following themes: 1). the leaders of Germany and Italy are primarily responsible for all of Europe's troubles as well as for military defeats already suffered and yet to be experienced; 2). these men are primarily motivated by selfishness, and their rule is characterized by mismanagement, exploitation, treachery, broken promises, false prophecies, and mutual mistrust among the Axis elite. The principal object of attack was of course Hitler himself, with Goebbels, Goering, Frank, Rosenberg, Mussolini, Ribbentrop, Himmler, Horthy, Kalley, and Tiso also receiving specific attention.

As may be expected, the majority of broadcasts exposing and ridiculing Axis leaders were beamed to Germany itself. The topic was also fairly prominent in English transmissions. It was least conspicuous in broadcasts to the occupied and Axis-dominated countries.

Dissension among Axis Partners and Satellites. This classification, closely related to the categories Axis Weakness, Axis Unrest, and Axis Exploitation, includes all allusions to friction and suspicion among members of the Axis coalition. Border incidents and reports of evasion of contracted obligations were among the subjects dealt with most frequently. Most of the items described the suspicion, resentment, and ill-feeling directed at Germany by the other countries in the Axis partnership -- notably Italy, Hungary, Rumania, and, less conspicuously, Bulgaria. In addition, reports of friction between Rumania and Hungary were frequent -- particularly in transmissions beamed to these countries





and to the occupied territories generally.

In the main, reports of Axis dissension were more common in broadcasts to the occupied countries -- especially Italy and Hungary -- than in the transmissions directed either to Germany or to England and North America.

Axis Exploitation. This classification, closely related to the category Exposé of Axis Leaders, contained items illustrating the manner in which Germany has exploited Europe and in particular the occupied countries. A large majority of the items dealt with the exploitation of labor, especially in reference to the drastic total mobilization measures, and the harsh restrictions and miserable working conditions imposed upon workers forcibly deported from their homes in occupied territory. Also constituting an important part of the material in this category were reports citing the requisition by the Germans of food and raw materials at the expense of populations in the subjugated countries, and items describing "Germanization" in occupied territories and the privileged place of the Herrenvolk in the new Europe.

In addition to Germany, the countries most frequently referred to in the items classified under this heading were, in order, France, Poland, and Rumania. Bulgaria, Hungary, Norway, the Baltic states, Greece, Italy, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Finland also received specific mention.

The proportion of items dealing with Axis exploitation was about twice as high among transmissions to occupied and Axis-dominated Europe as among those to Germany proper. Items in this category were least prominent among the English transmissions,



Finland under the Axis, Spain under the Axis. Though neither of these categories included more than 3 percent of all items or lineage, they are so closely related to the category Axis Exploitation that it appears desirable to discuss them here. A good majority of the items classified under the two headings actually dealt with reports of Axis exploitation in the two countries concerned. However, the manner in which these reports were interpreted and their juxtaposition and relationship with other subjects not classifiable under the term Exploitation suggested that they would be treated more appropriately under separate headings.

Items in these two categories are distinguished not so much by their content as by their intent. While dealing with different subjects, the items under both headings appear to have been designed to lead to similar conclusions in the minds of the audiences addressed; namely that, despite any outward impressions to the contrary, Finland and Spain, each in its own way, are in actuality fully under Axis domination economically, politically, and even militarily.

Finland under the Axis. Items in this category represented between 2 and 3 percent of the total sample. In addition to economic exploitation by the Germans, they dealt with subjects such as the following: the German control of Finnish air fields, the confiscation by the Germans of American relief supplies, the joint planning by Finland and Germany of an attack on the USSR, the fascist character of the Finnish government. Entries in this category were more frequent among English transmissions than those in Finnish. The only other language in which the topic was mentioned was German.



Spain under the Axis. Items under this heading constituted from 1 to 2 percent of all transmissions examined. The topics treated included the following: the domination and exploitation of Spain by Franco and the Falange, the domination, in turn, of these by Germany and Hitler, and the plight of the Blue Division on the Russian front. An interesting distinction between the items in the Finland under Axis category and those dealing with Spain was the constant emphasis in the latter of a conflict between the ruling caste, with its fascist and pro-German orientation, and the Spanish people, who are represented as fundamentally freedom-loving and anti-fascist in sentiment.

Almost all the items in the Spain under Axis classification were broadcast in Spanish for Spain; in contrast to the items in the Finland under Axis category, those dealing with Spain did not appear at all among English transmissions.

\* \* \* \*

The Polish Question, Allied Solidarity. In terms of lineage and number of items, the categories next in order of importance after Axis Exploitation are two, each of which, while including about 3 percent of all items, represented between 7 and 8 percent of the total lineage. As suggested by the above disparity, both categories included an unusual number of long, expository articles. The categories will now be considered in detail.

The Polish Question. The items classified under this head included all those bearing upon the liberation of Poland from the German yoke and its re-constitution as a free and independent state. Most of the items were in the form of speeches or articles from Pravda and from





other Soviet publications describing the aims and activities of the Union of Polish Patriots and the military unit sponsored by that organization -- the Kosciuzko Division. The Polish Government-in-Exile, with which the Soviet Government had already broken relations, was generally criticized in these articles for its "imperialistic" policy and its "uncooperative" attitude toward the Soviet government. In this connection, a common tack taken by Soviet broadcasters was to draw invidious comparisons between the attitude and actions of the Czech and Polish governments-in-exile. The cooperativeness of the Czechs, and specifically, their official condemnation of the Katyn massacre allegations, were contrasted with the orientation of the Polish Government, which was depicted as pro-German and reactionary. In the main, however, the approach utilized in the broadcasts was positive: Soviet wishes and intentions for the creation of "a strong and independent Poland" were stressed, the principles and program of the Union of Polish Patriots was dwelt upon at length, and all Poles were urged to fight for the restoration of Poland in the ranks either of the partisans or of the Kosciuzko Division, the latter being described as fully equipped and undergoing extensive training with the help of Red Army instructors.

As might be expected, by far the great majority of items dealing with the Polish Question were broadcast in Polish to Poland. A small but significant proportion was also found among the Czech and the English transmissions.

United Nations Solidarity. The unusual length of the items dealing with United Nations solidarity is accounted for probably in large measure by the fact that the anniversaries both of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and the Soviet-American Agreement occurred during the



period covered by the sample examined. Several of these long items were Pravda and Izvestiya editorials describing the terms of the two pacts and paying tribute to the Anglo-Soviet coalition as an alliance for the purpose of attaining both immediate and post-war aims. Items frequently ended with the comment that the Allied military initiative must be kept. While a second front in Western Europe was not mentioned specifically during the period under review, it was quite clearly implied that an invasion of Western Europe in the near future was both desired and expected.

Among other members of the United Nations to receive more than passing mention was France. The reaching of an understanding by De Gaulle and Giraud was acclaimed as a major contribution toward United Nations solidarity.

The proportion of broadcast material dealing with United Nations solidarity was markedly greater among transmissions to Britain and North America than among those either to Germany or to the occupied countries.

Axis Tyranny and Cruelty. Approximately 3 percent of all items and lineage in the sample described atrocities and tyrannical acts committed by the German military and civilian authorities in occupied territory. In general, these reports were of the same character as those cited extensively by Molotov's diplomatic note to the Allied and neutral powers of April, 1942. 1/ A recurrent note in broadcasts dealing with this topic was the insistence that those responsible for the crimes would be punished.

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1/ Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, Washington, 27 April 1942. .



Next to the USSR, the country most frequently referred to in reports of atrocities and tyrannical acts was France. Most of the other countries of occupied Europe were also mentioned.

The proportion of items in this category was somewhat greater among the German transmissions than among either broadcasts in English or in all the other European languages taken together.

Developments in the USSR. As has already been mentioned, this category included from 1 to 2 percent of all broadcast materials examined. Items classified under this heading treated with such subjects as cultural and scientific developments, the unity and loyalty of the many national and cultural groups and communities within the Soviet Union, the success of the Soviet War Loan, and the progress of reconstruction in territory reoccupied by the Red Army.

The proportion of items in this category was somewhat higher among English transmissions than among those directed to continental Europe.

Pro-Soviet Utterances. Soviet broadcasters make a practice of citing newspaper articles, speeches, and other public utterances made outside of the Soviet Union which express points of view favorable to or favored by the USSR. Such items constituted about 1 percent of all materials in the sample. Among the subjects dealt with were the following: American statements about Russian War Relief, Turkish editorials on the decline of German power, a message from Baltic-Americans approving of Soviet policy with regard to the Baltic states, and the Vatican's broadcast affirming race equality.

The country most frequently referred to in connection with pro-Soviet reports was Turkey; the United States was also mentioned often.





The proportion of items in the Pro-Soviet Utterances category was noticeably higher among English transmissions than among those directed to continental Europe.

\* \* \* \*

Each of the following categories included less than 1 percent of all items and lineage in the sample.

Prisoners' Names. Items in this category consisted of lists of soldiers captured by the Red Army. The lists were broadcast to the prisoners' homelands and included their names and home addresses. German, Hungarian, and Austrian lists were cited in the sample examined. Since such routine items are frequently omitted in published reports of monitored broadcasts, it is probable that prisoners' names were actually more common in Soviet broadcasts than the sample indicated.

Pan-Slavism. Two rather lengthy items -- one broadcast in Polish, the other in Czech -- dealt with the Pan-Slav movement. The Czech broadcast stressed the military importance of Pan-Slavism in terms of hastening German defeat. The Polish broadcast pointed to the excellent example set by the Czechs in their endorsement of the Pan-Slav program.

Czech Military Unit in the USSR. The three items in this category, all broadcast in Czech, described the Czech military unit fighting on the Eastern front under the command of Colonel Svoboda. The fact that the unit is subject to the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile and independent of the Soviet Government was stressed. At the same time, the faith of the Czech soldiers and civilians in the Red Army was also emphasized.



Pro-Axis Utterances. The two brief items in this category both referred to a continuing pro-Axis orientation on the part of the new regime in Argentina.

\* \* \* \*

The remaining items, constituting about 5 percent of the total sample, were not classifiable under any of the categories discussed above. These items consisted chiefly of short news bulletins the significance of which could not be fully determined.



## IX. The Credibility of Soviet Broadcasts

In view of the great number of reports in Soviet radio transmissions describing events and conditions within Axis Europe, the question of the credibility of Soviet broadcasts naturally becomes especially important. Unfortunately, during wartime, data for the complete verification of the numerous reports concerning events in Axis Europe are virtually inaccessible. Nevertheless, an attempt at estimating the credibility of Soviet broadcasts has been made by the FCC. <sup>1/</sup> In lieu of absolute criteria, this attempt utilized reports of non-Soviet news agencies and transmitters as evidences of confirmation. The weaknesses of such a method were conceded, but it was stressed that the results were sufficiently valid and reliable to warrant the conclusions reached. The sample examined included 194 reports made by the Soviet radio of events which allegedly had occurred within Axis Europe. "Partial or complete confirmation" was reported for 90 of the items (46 percent of the total); of these 90 confirmation was "reasonably complete" for 43, while for the remaining 47, "partial or indirect confirmation was found." Of the total number of reports, 91, or 47 percent, "fell in the category for which no confirmation was found, nor (sic) was there any particular reason for entertaining doubt concerning them." Only 13 items, representing 7 percent of the total were adjudged to be "highly dubious reports." The conclusion of the study reads as follows: "Some reflection and the use of common sense will

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<sup>1/</sup> The Credibility of Soviet Radio Stories, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission, 29 March 1943. (Confidential)





usually indicate those Soviet stories which are simply 'shots in the dark.' For every such 'wild story,' Soviet transmissions also include at least a dozen other stories concerning which there is either no occasion for doubt or there is reason to think that they are based largely on acceptable information."

#### X. Summary of the Content of Soviet Foreign Broadcasts

A general summary of the content of Soviet foreign broadcasts is presented in Table II which shows the topical categories in order of relative size along with the approximate proportion of total broadcast material found in each category. Where percentages for lineage and number of items differed, the median percentage value between the two is given.

It will be observed that the scale in the first column of the table departs from common practice in that equal intervals along the scale do not have equal significance; e.g., the interval between the 40 and 50 percent points is less than that between the 30 and 40 percent points, and so on. The advantage of this method of presentation is that it provides more room at the lower end of the scale where most of the entries occur. The theoretical justification of the procedure lies in the fact that the scale is roughly logarithmic rather than linear in character; that is, distance along the scale is directly proportional not to the percentage itself but to a logarithm or exponent to which a constant would have to be raised in order to obtain a value corresponding to the given percentage.



Table II  
Topical Categories in Order of Size  
with Approximate Proportion of Total  
Broadcast Material Represented  
by Each Category

Approximate Proportion of Items in Each Category	Category
50%	
40%	
30%	Axis Weakness
20%	Axis Unrest
10%	Military Developments
5%	Axis Leaders Axis Dissension Axis Exploitation  Polish Question United Nations Solidarity
3%	Tyranny and Cruelty Finland under the Axis
2%	Developments in USSR Pro-Soviet Utterances Spain under the Axis
1%	Prisoners' Names Pan-Slavism Czech Unit in USSR Pro-Axis Utterances



Differences in emphasis among transmissions to various regions are revealed by the presentation in Table III which shows the order of importance of topical categories for each of three regions along with the proportion of all material broadcast to a given region found in each category. For example, the data in Table III indicate that the category Military Developments was second in importance among transmissions to Britain and North America and included about 20 percent of all material broadcast in English. In contrast, this category represented less than 5 percent of transmissions to Germany.

The region in which a given category ranks highest is further indicated by the placement of an asterisk after the title of the category in the appropriate column. For example, the presence of an asterisk after the Military Developments category indicates that the proportion of items dealing with this topic was highest among English transmissions and obviates the necessity of comparison to discover this fact.





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Table III

Topical Categories in Order of Size among Transmissions  
to Germany, Occupied Europe, and Britain and North America  
with Approximate Proportion of Material Broadcast to the  
Given Area Found in each Category

Approximate proportion of material broadcast to a given area found in each category	Germany	Occupied Europe	Britain & North America
50%			
40%	Axis Weakness*		
30%		Axis Unrest*	Axis Weakness
20%	Axis Unrest		Military Developments*
	Axis Leaders*	Polish Question*	
		Axis Weakness	Axis Unrest
10%		Axis Exploitation*	United Nations Unity*
		Axis Dissension*	
5%	Axis Dissension Axis Exploitation Axis Cruelty* Military Developments		Axis Leaders Axis Dissension Finland under Axis*
3%		Axis Leaders	
	United Nations Unity Finland under Axis	Finland under Axis Axis Cruelty	Developments in USSR* Axis Cruelty Axis Exploitation Pro-Soviet Utterances*
2%			
1%	Developments in USSR Pro-Soviet Utterances Prisoners' Names Pro-Axis Utterances	Military Developments United Nations Unity Spain under Axis Pro-Soviet Utterances Developments in USSR Pan-Slavism Prisoners' Names Czechs in USSR	Polish Question

\* The presence of an asterisk denotes that the proportion of the items dealing with the topic was higher in the given column than in the other two columns.



## XI. The General Intent of Soviet Foreign Broadcasts

A study of the data in Tables II and III indicates that in Soviet foreign transmissions certain topics receive not only general but also differential emphasis in terms of the particular region to which they are directed. An analysis of these latter emphases, together with their variations, suggests possible conclusions as to the intent of Soviet foreign transmissions. The intent appears to be three-fold:

1. To fan the flames of popular unrest throughout Axis Europe -- particularly in the occupied territories, where reports of disaffection, resistance, revolt, and of their causes (Axis exploitation and oppression) are apt to be most effective. This conclusion is suggested by the prominence given to items dealing with Axis unrest in transmissions to Europe in general, and by the particular emphasis awarded to these items, along with those describing Axis dissension and exploitation, in transmissions to the occupied and Axis dominated countries.

2. To undermine the confidence and loyalty of the peoples of Axis Europe -- particularly of the German people, who might be expected to be on the whole more confident and loyal than those in occupied countries -- by discrediting the military, industrial, political, and spiritual strength of Fortress Europe and by sowing seeds of discontent and distrust toward the German government, its leaders, and its moral character. This conclusion appears warranted in view of the emphasis accorded to items describing Axis weakness in transmissions to all of Europe and their particular prominence, along with items dealing with Axis leadership and Axis cruelty, among transmissions to Germany proper.

3. To impress Britain and America with the military weakness of Axis Europe, the comparative immensity of the Soviet war effort, and



the extent of active opposition against the Axis within occupied Europe -- especially the strength of organized, armed resistance. This conclusion is suggested by the nature of the categories ranking highest (as well as the categories which are starred in the last column of Table III) -- particularly when it is recalled that over three-quarters of the items dealing with military events were concerned with developments on the Russo-German front 1/ and that, while the proportion of items describing Axis unrest in general was highest among transmissions to occupied Europe, the proportion of items dealing specifically with guerrilla warfare was highest in transmissions to Britain and North America. 2/

It cannot be established on the basis of the material examined that it was the direct and deliberate intent of Soviet broadcasts to encourage the peoples of Axis Europe to look toward Moscow for leadership and inspiration. However, if the Soviet transmissions are actually effective in impressing the Europeans with the dominant role of the USSR in directing the struggle against Germany both at the front and behind the lines, it is quite likely that the broadcasts have the effect of causing many peoples of the occupied and enemy countries to regard the Soviet Union as their benefactor and leader. Nor is there any doubt that the Soviet government is fully aware of this fact.

However, as to whether the Soviet government regards the resultant gain of friendship and goodwill merely as a useful by-product, or whether the cultivation of pro-Soviet sympathy and support is carefully designed

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1/ Supra, page 15.

2/ Supra, page 20.





to pave the way for the establishment of spheres of influence in the post-war world cannot be ascertained on the basis of the materials examined in this study; it is part of the larger question of Soviet political intentions, which is beyond the scope of this study. At any rate, in the light of the prominence given in Soviet foreign broadcasts to reports of popular resistance, coupled -- as these reports often were -- with appeals for increased opposition and revolt, the declaration of the Union of Polish Patriots and, in particular, the recent declaration of the National Free Germany Committee (which came after the period considered in this study) are hardly expected. Whatever other ends these declarations may serve, they represent an effort to consolidate the forces of opposition -- a logical step toward the marshalling of forces behind the German lines on the Eastern Front.

Indeed, the phrase "marshalling of forces behind the German lines" suggests a possible interpretation for the entire major pattern of the content and intent of Soviet foreign transmissions. In the first place, it is quite clear that the Soviet broadcasts of the period studied reflect the strong Russian desire for an Allied invasion and represent a prelude to the outspoken demands for a second front which have been made by the Soviet Union in recent weeks (July, August 1943).

As has been mentioned, the desire for an Allied invasion of Western Europe was clearly implied in many of the English transmissions dealing with Allied solidarity. It was further reflected, indirectly but nevertheless unmistakably, in the fact that the military activities on the Eastern Front were emphasized particularly in broadcasts to Britain and America. The importance to the Russians of an Allied attack upon France and Germany was also evidenced in the fact that the



Allied air raids on Western Europe received much more attention in Soviet transmissions than the capture of Pantelloria and Allied progress in the direction of southern Italy.

As has already been suggested, the emphasis in Soviet transmissions to the Allied powers on the weakness of Fortress Europe (the weakness of the "Atlantic Wall" being stressed particularly), and the strength of militant opposition to the Axis within that fortress are also related to the Soviet desire for a "second front," for, if the Allies could be convinced that the above conditions prevail, they would presumably be more likely to undertake a direct offensive against Germany from the west.

Finally, the Soviet desire for a second front, or for the "marshalling of forces behind the German lines," also provides a possible interpretation for the emphasis given to items dealing with Axis weakness and Axis unrest in transmissions to Europe itself. Discouragement, apathy, and weakened morale; mistrust, disaffection, resentment and hatred;-and particularly the resistance and revolt which these conditions foster -- are not, of course, military operations in the usual sense. Nevertheless, they do hit the enemy and hit him behind his own lines. As long as a second front in the form of a full-fledged Allied offensive against Germany does not exist, an indirect attack upon Europe from within possibly remains the best substitute -- a substitute which the Soviet broadcasters regard as sufficiently important to emphasize even at the expense of the Allied war effort as such. For example, in discussing the Allied bombing raids, Soviet broadcasts to Europe featured not so much the fact that these bombings were evidences of Allied might as the effect which the bombings had in crippling



production and breaking morale. It was for this reason that the majority of the items in which the Allied air raids were mentioned were classified under the category Axis Weakness rather than under the sub-heading of Allied Military Activities in the European Theater in the category of Military Developments.

\* \* \* \*

Superimposed upon the above general pattern but clearly related to it there are perceptible certain more specific aims on the part of Soviet broadcasters. Notable among these are the following:

1. To win the friendship of the Polish people and their support of such policies and actions as those advocated by the Union of Polish Patriots as opposed to those represented by the Polish Government-in-Exile. To the end of illustrating the desired attitude and its advantages, Soviet broadcasters (with implied invidious comparison) are fond of citing the example of Czechoslovakia, praising the policies pursued both by the people and government-in-exile.

2. To consolidate cooperation with the USSR and resistance against the Axis on the part of Slavic peoples through union under the banner of Pan-Slavism.

3. To convince Britain and America in particular that Finland is unequivocally an Axis ally. The ultimate hope is probably that of inducing the United States to break off relations with Finland or even to declare war on that nation.

4. To impress upon the Spanish people the fascist, pro-German character of their government and to encourage them in resistance against contributing to the Axis war effort.

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Clearly pertinent in a discussion of the intent of Soviet foreign broadcasts is the fact that not a single reference to Japan or, for that matter, to the war in the Pacific, was found in the entire six-week sample of broadcasts examined. This omission has been reported from time to time in FCC releases and appears to be the result of a studied policy. By not committing itself, by not putting on the record expression either of friendship or hostility, the Soviet Union does not disturb the formally correct relations with Japan as of the moment, but at the same time leaves the way open for a full-blast radio offensive should the occasion for such an offensive arise.

A second significant omission, but fully to be expected in the light of developments in the Soviet Union during recent years, is the complete absence of traditional Communist ideology along with its symbols and ideals. In this connection, it is of interest to note that the broadcasts examined (all of which occurred subsequent to the dissolution of the Comintern) no longer opened with the previously customary clarion call: "Workers of the world, unite!"

Finally, the data in Tables II and III, taken together with the subsequent analysis and discussion, illustrate the validity and full significance of the statement made earlier in this report: that the primary concern of Soviet foreign transmissions appears to be the attempt to influence the manifold forces bearing upon the successful prosecution of the war.














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